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I add intangible capital to a variant of the neoclassical growth model and study the
implications for cross-country income dierences. I calibrate the parameters associated
with intangible capital by using new estimates of investment in intangibles by Corrado
et al. (2006). When intangible capital is added to the model, the TFP elasticity of output
increases from 2.14 to 2.64. This nding implies that the addition of intangible capital
increases the ability of the neoclassical growth model to explain international income dif-
ferences by more than a factor of two.
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11 Introduction
Some intermediate goods continue to be useful in production after the rst period of their use.
Examples include computer software, output of research and development (R&D) activity, ad-
vertisement, management's time spent on promoting the business and expenditure on training
of workers and managers.1 Since most of the intermediate goods in question are intangible and
their benet extends beyond the rst period of their use, I shall call the expenditure on these
goods investment in intangibles and the accumulated value of this investment, after appropri-
ate depreciation, intangible capital. 2 The expenditure on these intermediate goods ought to
be treated as investment, but it is not [Corrado et al. (2006)]. In the National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) of the US, expenditure on these goods is treated as expenditure on
intermediate goods and hence not included in the gross domestic product (GDP).3 This is a
measurement error.
In this paper, I study the implications of correcting this measurement error for international
income dierences. I write a one-sector neoclassical growth model that is very similar to the
models in Mankiw et al. (1992) and Chari et al. (1996) except that it also includes intangible
capital. In this respect the model is similar to the one in Parente & Prescott (1994). I then
ask: how much more of the international income variation can the model explain when it is
augmented with intangible capital?
The answer to this question depends crucially on values of the parameters associated with
intangible capital. In order to calibrate these parameters one needs, among other targets, an
estimate of the size of intangible investment relative to the GDP. Until recently, no credible
estimate of this investment was available. Earlier studies by Parente & Prescott (1994) and
Prescott (1998) speculated that the size of this investment was around 40% and 32% of the
GDP. In a recent study, Corrado et al. (2006) (from here on CHS) provide estimates of intangible
investment in the US economy for the postwar period. To my knowledge this is the rst study
that provides scientic estimates of intangible investment at the macro level. They also provide
estimates of the depreciation rate of intangible capital. The contribution of the present study
is to use these estimates to pin down the parameters associated with intangible capital. The
1Some of these items are clearly services but for the simplicity of exposition I shall call them goods.
2Human capital is also intangible. However, in this paper I shall distinguish between human capital and
intangible capital. The reason is that many authors have studied the implications for international income
dierences of adding human capital to the models of growth. In this paper, I want to study the implications for
income dierences when intangible capital, as dened above, is added to a growth model that already includes
human capital.
3The only exception is the expenditure on computer software that has been treated as investment since 1997.
2main nding is that the addition of intangible capital more than doubles the ability of the
neoclassical growth model to explain international income dierences.
It is hardly surprising that the addition of intangible capital to the neoclassical growth
model adds to the model's ability to explain international variation in income. This is because
a higher share of reproducible factors in output leads to a higher elasticity of output with
respect to TFP. What is surprising is the fact that even a much smaller, relative to the earlier
studies, estimate of intangible investment, can more than double the model's ability to generate
dierences in income.
A higher investment in intangible capital implies a greater share for it in the output. This
in turn implies that more of the cross-country variation in output is due to factor accumulation
and less due to dierences in total factor productivity (TFP) or the eciency with which
these factors are used. This last observation relates this paper to what may be called the
`neoclassical revival debate'. In this debate, one group of economists, most prominent among
them are Mankiw et al. (1992), argues that an extended version of the neoclassical growth model
can explain most of the variation in cross-country output. The other group argues that factor
accumulation cannot explain most of the international variation in output and other factors,
summed up under the heading of TFP, play a more important role. Important papers in this
tradition include Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall & Jones (1999) and, more recently,
Hulten & Isaksson (2007). In this paper I take an intermediate position. On the one hand,
I argue that the neoclassical model can explain a lot more variation in cross-country output
than is possible without intangible capital in the model. On the other hand, I acknowledge
that even with intangible capital in the model, there is some variation in output that the model
cannot explain and hence attributes to dierences in TFP.
2 The Model
Consider a one-sector neoclassical growth model with three types of capital: physical (K),
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where Yt is output, At is total factor productivity (TFP), 1 uht uzt is the fraction of human
capital used in production. I assume that TFP grows exogenously at rate 
 and all per capita
3variables grow in the steady state at rate g, which is dened as:
g = (1 + 
)
1
1 k z h   1: (2)
From this point on, I shall focus on quantities that are stationary in the steady state. Let
yt  Yt=[(1 + g)(1 + n)]t, where n is the population growth rate. Let kt, zt and ht be dened
in the same manner. Let a  At=[1 + 
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I next specify laws of motion for the three state variables: k, z and h. The law of motion for
physical capital is standard and given by
(1 + g)(1 + n)kt+1 = (1   k)kt + xkt; (4)
where k is the depreciation rate and xk is the investment in physical capital.
There are two popular approaches to model the accumulation of human capital. According
to the rst approach, human capital accumulation requires nancial investment (see, for exam-
ple, Mankiw et al. (1992) [equation (9a), p.416] and Chari et al. (1996) [equation (3.3) p.11]).
According to the second approach, human capital accumulation is time intensive and hence a
fraction of human capital has to be taken out of production and devoted to the accumulation
of human capital. Examples of this approach include Lucas (1988) [equation (13), p.19] and
Prescott (1998) [p.541]. I combine the two approaches and assume that the accumulation of
human capital requires both nancial investment as well as time.4 The law of motion for human
capital is
(1 + g)(1 + n)ht+1 = (1   h)ht + (uhtht) x

ht; (5)
where h is the depreciation rate, uht is the fraction of human capital devoted to the production
of human capital and xht is the nancial investment in the accumulation of human capital.
The law of motion for intangible capital is similar to the one for human capital and is given
by
(1 + g)(1 + n)zt+1 = (1   z)zt + (uztht)x
z; (6)
where z is the depreciation rate, uz is the fraction of human capital that is devoted to the
4For further details on his human capital technology, see Erosa et al. (2007).
4production of intangible capital and xz is the investment in intangible capital. If I assumed
 = 0 and  = 1, (6) would be very similar to the law of motion for intangible capital in Parente
& Prescott (1994). However, I assume ,  > 0 and do not impose any other restriction on
these parameters except the general restriction in (7) below. The inclusion of human capital
in the production technology for intangible capital is motivated by the large theoretical and
empirical literature that suggests a positive connection between the stock of human capital and
technology adoption.5 Although human capital is important for producing intangible capital,
its inclusion in the law of motion is not critical for the main result. I show in Section 3 that even
if the fraction of human capital going into the accumulation of intangible capital is negligible,
the main result remains intact.
To ensure overall decreasing returns to accumulable factors, I impose the following restric-
tion on parameters of the model:
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; (7)
which simplies to k + h + z < 1, if  +   = 1 and  +  = 1.6
It is important to note that after the addition of intangible capital, y is no longer the
measured output as in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Instead, it also
includes investment in intangible capital. In symbols,
y = ym + xz; (8)
where ym is the measured output (as in NIPA) and xz is the investment in intangible capital.
I call y the total output and ym the measured output.
The total output can be used for either consumption or investment in physical, intangible
or human capital. Hence the aggregate resource constraint is
ct = yt   xkt   xht   xzt: (9)
5Here, following Parente & Prescott (1994), I interpret intangible capital as technology capital. Notable
papers that relate technology adoption to human capital include Nelson & Phelps (1966), Benhabib & Spiegel
(1994), Caselli & Coleman (2001), Chander & Thangavelu (2004), Comin & Hobijn (2004), Benhabib & Spiegel
(2005) and Beaudry et al. (2006). Keller (2004), in his survey of the literature on international technology
diusion, lists human capital as one of the most important determinants of technology diusion.
6When I calibrate the parameters, I ignore this restriction and choose the parameters to match the targets.
I then check whether the calibrated parameters violate the restriction. For the parameters that I report in this
paper, the restriction is never violated.
5The social planner chooses the sequence fct;kt+1;zt+1;ht+1;uht;uztg1
t=0, given k0, z0 and















where  is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.7
The steady state equilibrium is a set of allocations fc;k;z;h;uh;uzg such that, given the
constraints, utility is maximized and the steady state variants of (3), (4), (5), (6) and (9) are
satised.
When the model is solved for its steady state, the steady state level of output is
y = ba; (12)
where b is a constant that depends on the parameters of the model and  (the TFP elasticity
of output) is given by
 =
1    
(1    )(1   k   z)   (h + z)
: (13)
I assume that technology and preferences are the same across countries and the only thing that
diers is the TFP. Hence b is the same across countries and output of country i relative to that









In international income comparisons,  is the key parameter. In the next subsection I calibrate
the parameters of the model to get some idea about the value of .
2.1 Calibration
I calibrate the parameters of the model such that the steady state of the model is consistent with
certain long run features (targets) of the US economy. I report the targets and the calibrated
parameters in Table 1 and provide details of the calibration strategy in Appendix A. According
7In (10),  is the modied discount factor. Given CRRA preferences,  is equal to ~ (1+n)(1+g)
1 , where
~  is the discount factor.
6to Heston et al. (2006), from 1950 to 2004, the average population growth rate in the US has
been 1:17% and per capita consumption growth rate has been 2:34%. Hence I set n = 0:0117
and g = 0:0234. I choose  such that the implicit real rate of interest is 5%. I choose  to be
equal to 2. This is on the lower side of the range of values used in the literature.8 I assume
8% annual depreciation for physical capital. There is no satisfactory way to pin down h (the
depreciation rate of human capital). I follow Mankiw et al. (1992) and Chari et al. (1996) and
assume that h is equal to k. I shall say more about this parameter when I do sensitivity
checks on my results.
I choose k such that the steady state ratio of investment in physical capital (xk) to measured
output (ym) is 0:2.
The value of   depends on the steady state value of uh i.e. the fraction of time spent
accumulating human capital. I assume this fraction to be equal to the ratio of average years
of schooling to average life expectancy. The average years of schooling in the US in 2000 were
12.25 [Barro & Lee (2000)] and the life expectancy at birth was 79. This gives uh = 0:155.
Parameters h and  can be jointly identied using a target for investment in human capital
as a fraction of GDP (see (17)). I denote this fraction by h. It is clear from (13) that it is
the product of h and  that matters for international income dierences. However, for the
sake of completeness I use a target for skill premium to identify h separately. I dene skill
premium as the ratio of the combined share of labor and human capital (i.e. 1   k   z)
to the share of labor (i.e. 1   h   k   z). The target value of skill premium is a moot
point. What makes it even harder to use it as a target is the fact that it has been rising over
time [Krusell et al. (2000)]. However, since this target is not going to aect , it is not very
important for the question of interest. I use the ratio of average earnings of workers with a
high school diploma to the average earnings of workers without high school as my target for the
skill premium. According to Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2002) this ratio in the year 1998 was equal
to 2.33 (= $34;211=$14;705). This target for the skill premium pins down h (see (18)). I then
choose  to match investment in human capital as a fraction of GDP. According to Haveman
& Wolfe (1995) this fraction is 12:7%.9 Hence I set h = 0:127.
There are four parameters related to intangible capital: z, z,  and . I use two targets in
CHS and the combined share of labor and human capital in output as the third target to pin
8See Ljungqvist & Sargent (2004), p.426 for a discussion on the value of .
9This includes private as well as public expenditure on children aged 0-18. For details see Table 1 in Haveman
& Wolfe (1995).
7down the rst three of these parameters. My target for the fourth parameter is the fraction of
time spent on accumulation of intangible capital (i.e. uz). Unfortunately no estimate of this
target is available. Instead, I try three dierent values of this target and compare the results.
The rst parameter, z, is the depreciation rate of intangible capital. Little is known about
it and based on whatever limited information is available, CHS make certain assumptions
about the depreciation rate of various components of intangible capital. I use their estimates
of depreciation rates of the various components of intangible capital and compute a weighted
average, where the weight of each component is its share in intangible investment. This gives
a depreciation rate of 34%.
The other two parameters, z and , can be jointly identied by choosing a target for invest-
ment in intangible capital as a fraction of measured output (see (19)). I denote this fraction by
z. Here I closely follow CHS. Their denition of investment is based on the idea that \any use
of resources that reduces current consumption in order to increase it in the future qualies as
an investment". They distinguish between tangible and intangible investments. In the tangible
category they include the usual investments in structures, tools and machinery. For intangibles,
they identify three main categories of investment. The rst category is computerized invest-
ment and consists mainly of computer software. The second category is innovative property,
which is divided into two subcategories. The rst subcategory is scientic R&D and consists of
National Science Foundation's industrial R&D series. The second subcategory is non-scientic
R&D, which includes revenues of non-scientic commercial R&D industry, spending for new
product development by nancial services and insurance rms and cost of development of new
product by the entertainment industry. The third category is economic competencies. This
is also divided into two subcategories. The rst subcategory is brand equity and consists of a
fraction of the advertisement expenditure. The second subcategory is rm specic resources
and includes a fraction of the cost of employer-provided worker training and management time
devoted to enhancing the productivity of the rm.10 According to the estimates in CHS, aver-
age investment in intangibles was 15:7% of the measured output during the period from 2000
to 2003.11
In order to separately identify z and , I use the combined share of human capital and labor
10For further details see CHS.
11This estimate, is much lower than 40% or 32% assumed by Parente & Prescott (1994) and Prescott (1998).
However, according to CHS, investment in intangible capital has been increasing over time. Hence this estimate
cannot be considered a long term observation about the US economy. In the section on sensitivity analysis, I
examine the sensitivity of my conclusions to the choice of this target.
8in measured output as the second target. In the context of a standard neoclassical model, it is
common to assume that the share of physical capital in measured output is around one-third
and the remaining two-third is shared by labor and human capital.12. This is further supported
by the nding in Gollin (2002) that the labor share of income is between 65% and 80% in most
of the countries. For calibration results in Table 1, I assume a combined share of labor and
human capital in output of 65%.13 It is important to note that the choice of this target does
not aect the value of  in (13) because z and  appear as a product in that equation.
The fourth parameter related to intangible capital is . It maps into our target for uz. We
do not have any reliable estimate of the time spent in adopting new technology. However, it
is most likely to be a small fraction of the total time allocated to production. In the following
analysis I assume that ve percent of the working time is spent on adoption of new technology
(i.e. uz = 0:05). In Section 3 below, I try other values of this target and show that the main
result is not sensitive to the value of uz assumed here.
2.2 International Income Dierences
The implications of the model for international income dierences depend on the value of . I
rst assume that there is no investment in intangible capital i.e. xz = uz = 0. When the model
the calibrated for this special case the value of  is 2:14. This implies that in order to explain a
fortyfold dierence in output between the rich and the poor countries, TFP in the former must
be 5.62 times higher than that in the latter (5:622:14 = 40).14 In other words, in the absence of
intangible capital, the model can magnify a TFP ratio of 5.62 to an output ratio of 40. Here
it is instructive to compare the results of the model with some earlier studies. The parameter
estimates in Mankiw et al. (1992) imply a value of  equal to 2:44. The calibration in Erosa
et al. (2007) implies a value of  equal to 2:77. The value of  from my calibration is lower than
what these other studies found. This can be taken care of by assuming a lower depreciation
rate for human capital (see the discussion on h in Section 3 below). For example, if I assumed
4% depreciation for human capital, the value of  would be equal to 2.44, the same as implied
12See, for example, Mankiw et al. (1992).
13This is the combined share of human capital and labor out of measured output. If we used total output
instead of the measured output, the share would be around 56%.
14According to Heston et al. (2006), in the year 2000 the ratio of real GDP of the richest 10% countries to
that of the poorest 10% countries was 41.5. In this paper, I round this ratio to the nearest tens and study how
big are the TFP dierences needed to explain a forty fold dierence in real output. Throughout the paper, I
shall use the phrase `TFP ratio' to refer to the TFP ratio between the rich and the poor countries required to
generate fortyfold dierence in outputs. Moreover, the phrase `observed income dierences' in the paper would
mean the fortyfold income dierences.
9by the parameter estimates in Mankiw et al. (1992). If I assumed 2:5% depreciation for human
capital, the value of  would be equal to 2.76, which is almost the same as what Erosa et al.
(2007) nd. However, it is not the absolute value of  that is important for the question that I
am trying to answer. What is important is the increase in the value of  once intangible capital
is added to the model.
I next calibrate the full model using the target values of xz=ym and uz as reported in Table
1. For the full model the value of  is 2.64.15 With this value of  we need a TFP ratio of 4.05
to explain a fortyfold dierence in output. Recall that this ratio was 5.62 if we assumed zero
investment in intangible capital. Another way to look at this dierence is the following. In the
model with no investment in intangibles, a TFP ratio of 5.62 could generate a fortyfold income
dierence (5:622:14 = 40). In the full model, the same TFP ratio can generate a ninety-vefold
income dierence (5:622:64 = 95). This is the main nding of the paper that the addition
of intangible capital to a standard neoclassical growth model, more than doubles the model's
ability to explain cross-country income variation.
3 Sensitivity Analysis
I have shown above that the ability of the neoclassical growth model to explain international
income dierences is signicantly improved when intangible capital is added to the model to-
gether with physical and human capital. In this section I study the sensitivity of this conclusion
to changes in some of the parameters and targets about which, in my opinion, we have less
reliable information than others. My strategy for analysis in this section is the following. I pick
a parameter (or target), one at a time, and try two or three dierent values for it other than
the one used in the analysis above. I then study what happens to the comparison between the
model without intangible capital and the full model at dierent values of the parameter or the
target.
All the relevant numbers are reported in Table 2. The rows in bold show the parameter (or
target) values and corresponding values of s and TFP ratios used in the analysis above. These
are my preferred values. Although in Table 2 I have reported the values of  and the TFP
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10ratio, in the sensitivity analysis below I shall focus on just one number: the income dierence
generated by the full model using the TFP ratio of the model without intangible capital. I shall
denote this number by yR to signify that it is the relative income of a rich country compared
to that of a poor country under the full model given that the relative income under the model
without intangible capital was 40. yR is reported in the last column of Table 2. The main
result in this paper is that yR is 95 i.e. if the model without intangible capital can generate
40-fold income dierences with a certain TFP ratio, the full model can generate 95-fold income
dierences with the same TFP ratio. When I change a parameter or a target and yR remains
close to 95 or increases above 95, I shall conclude that my main result is robust to the change
in the parameter or the target. However, if as a result of a change in a parameter or a target,
yR falls well below 95, I shall conclude that my main result is sensitive to a change in the
parameter or the target.
A quick look at the last column of Table 2 shows that in case of a change in the following
ve parameters (or targets), yR either increases or does not change much. The parameters (or
targets) are: , h, h, uh and uz. I conclude that the main conclusion of this paper is not
sensitive to the choice of these parameters or targets. However, I would still like to comment
further on h, i.e. the depreciation rate of human capital.
There is no reliable estimate of h available. Earlier studies have assumed dierent depre-
cation rates for human capital. Lucas (1988), for example, assumed zero depreciation. Mankiw
et al. (1992) and Chari et al. (1996) assumed that the depreciation rate of human capital was
equal to that of physical capital. I have followed the same assumption in this paper. There is
a large literature that tries to measure the value of human capital in an economy.16 There are
especially quite a few studies about the US. However, the results are all over the place. At one
extreme, some studies conclude that the value of the stock of human capital is the same or even
less than the value of the stock of physical capital. At the other extreme, some studies nd the
stock of human capital to be twenty times as valuable as the stock of physical capital. In view
of such inconclusive evidence it is hard to make any precise statement about the relative size of
human capital, which could help us pin down the depreciation parameter. Intuitively, it seems
highly unlikely that if in a particular period both uh and xh were zero, the aggregate stock of
human capital in the economy would fall by 8%. In my opinion, the aggregate human capital
of a country depreciates at a much lower rate. If this is the case, it will further strengthen
16See the survey article by Le et al. (2003).
11the conclusion that the addition of intangible capital increases the neoclassical growth model's
ability to explain international income variation.
There is one parameter (z) and one target (z) in Table 2, which, when changed, can
adversely aect the main conclusion of the paper. I comment on each separately. First, I
comment on z (the depreciation rate of intangible capital). In the analysis above, I use
z = 0:34, based on the estimates in CHS. To arrive at these estimates they use empirical
evidence and some educated guesses. If the actual depreciation rate of intangible capital is
less than 34%, I am ne because my results are further strengthened.17 However, if the actual
rate is more than 34% my results are somewhat weakened. For example, if I assume full
depreciation of intangible capital then yR = 79, which is still almost twice as large as 40.
Hence the ability of the neoclassical model still almost doubles. But this leads to another issue.
If the depreciation rate of intangible capital is 100%, there is no dierence between intangible
capital and intermediate goods. If that is the case then why add just a fraction of intermediate
goods to the model. Why not add all the intermediate goods. This issue is important and
needs further comment. I return to it in Section 4 below.
I now comment on the eects of a change in my target for z, the ratio of investment in
intangibles to the measured income, on yR. This target pins down  and z jointly. Following
the estimates in CHS, I chose z = 0:157. This is based on their estimates of investment
in intangible capital in the US during the period 2000-2003. However, according to CHS,
this investment has been rising over time and if we compute the average for the post-WWII
period, it is close to 0.10. It is instructive to see how the model fares when a lower target
for z is chosen. When z is lowered from 0.157 to 0.10, yR declines from 95 to 69. Hence
the improvement in the model's ability to explain income dierences when intangible capital
is added to it, depends crucially on the size of investment in intangible capital. This is hardly
surprising. In fact, the main point of the paper is that this investment is not too small and
hence by excluding intangible capital from the analysis we omit some of the variation in output
that the neoclassical model is capable of explaining. Also note that my target value for z is
much lower than what Parente & Prescott (1994) and Prescott (1998) assumed. If I assumed
z = 0:4, as Parente & Prescott (1994) did, yR would shoot up to 436.
17The implicit depreciation rate of intangible capital in Parente & Prescott (1994) is close to 0.03. If I use
this depreciation rate, i.e. z = 0:03, the value of  increases to 3.85 and y
R jumps to 770.
124 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I construct a variant of the neoclassical growth model to study its implications for
international income dierences. The model features intangible capital in addition to physical
and human capital. I use recent estimates of investment in intangible capital to pin down some
key parameters of the model. The main nding is that the addition of intangible capital, to
an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model, more than doubles the model's ability to
account for cross-country variation in income. Specically the same TFP ratio that generates
a fortyfold income dierence in the model without intangible capital can generate a ninety-
vefold dierence in income with intangible capital in the model. This result is robust to
dierent parameterizations of the model. However, there are at least two caveats that must be
noted.
The rst caveat is the following. In a general sense the paper generates this result by
adding a fraction of intermediate goods to the neoclassical growth model. The fraction that
is added consists of the intermediate goods that do not depreciate away completely in the
production process. Here a relevant question is: what if all the intermediate goods produced
in the economy are added to the model? This would be like assuming an aggregate production
function similar to the one in Romer (1990). In fact this is the main idea behind a recent
paper by Jones (2008). The answer, as elaborated by Jones (2008), is that the inclusion of all
intermediate goods will increase the value of  signicantly and the ability of the neoclassical
model to generate realistic income dierences from very small dierences in TFP will improve
tremendously.
To study the implications of Jones (2008) for the results of the present paper, I have written
down a stripped down version of Jones (2008) in Appendix B. In this model total output is
produced by using intermediate goods in addition to the three types of capital, i.e., physical,
human and intangible. Recall that `intangible capital' consists of those intermediate goods that
have a less than 100% depreciation rate. `Intermediate goods' in this model are those that have
a depreciation rate of 100%. First, assume that both nancial and time investment in intangible
capital is zero i.e. xz = uz = 0. This, in eect, amounts to excluding intangible capital from
the model. My calibration results show that the value of  for this model would be 4.48. This
is huge compared to any thing that we have seen in the literature so far. With  this big, we
need a TFP ratio of just 2.28 to generate fortyfold income dierences. Next, I add intangible
capital to the model by allowing both xz and uz to be positive. When I recalibrate the model,
13using the same targets for xz and uz as in Section 2 above, I get a value of  equal to 4.91.
This is bigger than 4.48 but the dierence is not as big as between the values of  in the model
without intangible capital and the full model. Another way to compare the two versions (the
one without intangible capital and the other with intangible capital) of the model in Appendix
B is to use the same TFP ratio. If we use a TFP ratio of 2.28, the version without intangible
capital can generate fortyfold income dierences (2:284:48 = 40). With the same TFP ratio
the version with intangible capital generates fty-sevenfold income dierences (2:284:91 = 57).
Hence the addition of intangible capital to a model that already features intermediate goods
does not improve the model's ability to generate international income dierences by as much
as the same addition to a model without intermediate goods does.
The second caveat is about out-of-steady-state dynamics of the model. Given that the
combined share of the three types of capital (i.e. h + k + z) is 0.76 in the full model,
the model exhibits slow transition to steady state. Slow in the sense that it cannot explain
growth miracles. However, the convergence rate implied by the model is more in line with the
estimates in Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992), who require a share of capital parameter of around
0.8 to explain the observed rates of convergence.
Nevertheless, the paper clearly shows that the neoclassical growth model can explain a large
fraction of cross-country variation in income. It also shows that factor accumulation is more
important than previously thought and investment in software, R&D, product promotion etc.
is as important as investment in physical and human capital.
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D1i(n;g;;i) = [(1 + g)(1 + n)   (1   i)]
D2i(n;g;;i) = [(1 + g)(1 + n)   (1   i)];
where i = fh;k;zg. Also let i  xSS
i =ySS
m , where SS in the superscript refers to steady-state
values. I now describe the calibration strategy in some detail.
The targets of population growth rate, per capita consumption growth rate and depreciation
of physical capital match one-to-one with parameters n, g and k. Parameter  is chosen from
the empirical literature. Parameter , the modied discount rate, depends on n, g,  and ~ ,
where ~  = 1=(1+r) and r is the target real interest rate. Specically,  = ~ [(1+g)(1+n)]1 .




















I pick   to match the steady-state target for uh, the fraction of time spent on accumulating
human capital. From the steady-state of the model,





Once I have determined  , I pick  and h jointly to match the steady-state target for xh=ym.






(1   uh   uz): (17)
It is important to point out that for the question of interest, it is the product h that matters.
However, in order to identify  and h separately, I pick h to match some empirical estimate
of the skill premium (SP). To do so, I dene the SP as the ratio of the combined share of
18human capital and labor to the share of labor in output, i.e.
SP =
1   k   z
1   k   h   z
:
This gives,







I pick z to match the target depreciation rate of intangible capital. Parameters  and
z are picked jointly to match the target investment in intangible capital. The steady state







Once again, it is important to note that it is the product z that matters for the question of
interest. However, the two parameters can separately be identied using as target the combined
share of human capital and labor in the measured output. This share is dened as
shc = (1   k   z)(1 + z); (20)
where shc is the combined share of human capital and labor in the measured output. (20)
gives the following value for z.




The last parameter is . To pin it down my target is the fraction of time spent accumulating
intangible capital (uz). Given this target the following expression solves for .
 =
uz






B A Model with Intermediate Goods













19where m denotes the intermediate good component of the nal good used in production. In-
termediate goods depreciate fully in production. Hence the law of motion for m is given by
(1 + g)(1 + n)mt+1 = xmt; (23)
where xmt is investment in intermediate goods. In words, this is the part of the nal output
that is used as intermediate input in the production of nal output in the next period. The
laws of motion for other state variables, namely h, k and z are the same as in the model of the
main text. The steady-state output is
y = ba; (24)
where  is given by
 =
1    
(1    )[1   k(1   )   (1   z)   z]   [h(1   ) + z]
: (25)
The only new parameter in this model is . Following Jones (2008), I set it equal to 0.5. I
then ask the following question: if all the investment in intermediate goods is treated as xm, as
had been done in the NIPA until recently, what would be the value of ? The answer is: 4.48.
With this value of , we need a TFP ratio of 2.28 to explain forty-fold income dierences. I
next ask, if some part of the investment in intermediate goods is treated as xz, as suggested
by CHS, what would be the value of ? The answer is: 4.91 (based on xz=ym = 0:157). With
this value of , the required TFP ratio is 2.12.
20Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values and Targets
Parameter Value Target Target Value
g 0.02 Growth in p.c. consumption 2:34%
n 0.01 Growth in population 1:17%
 0.94 Real interest rate 5%
 2.00 Empirical literature -
k 0.08 Empirical literature -
h 0.08 Same as k -
k 0.27 xk=ym 0:20
h 0.32 Skill premium 2:33
  0.24 uh 0.155
 0.42 xh=ym 0:127
z 0.34 Estimates in Corrado et al. (2006) -
z 0.17 Combined share of L and H in Ym 0:65
 0.94 xz=ym 0:157
 0.14 uz 0:05
 2.64
21Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity Model w/o z Full Model
Parameter or Target 0 TFPR0 F TFPRF yR
 =
2.0 2.14 5.62 2.64 4.05 95
2.5 2.35 4.79 2.97 3.46 105
3.0 2.63 4.06 3.42 2.94 121
h =
0 6.61 1.75 9.73 1.46 232
0.04 2.44 4.53 3.05 3.35 100
0.08 2.14 5.62 2.64 4.05 95
0.16 1.97 6.53 2.41 4.62 92
z =
1.00 2.14 5.62 2.53 4.30 79
0.34 2.14 5.62 2.64 4.05 95
0.17 2.14 5.62 2.79 3.75 124
0.08 2.14 5.62 3.10 3.29 211
h =
0.127 2.14 5.62 2.64 4.05 95
0.086 1.85 7.31 2.26 5.10 90
0.054 1.68 8.97 2.04 6.10 88

z =
0.400 2.14 5.62 3.52 2.85 436
0.157 2.14 5.62 2.64 4.05 95
0.100 2.14 5.62 2.45 4.50 69
uh =
0.100 2.09 5.82 2.58 4.18 94
0.155 2.14 5.62 2.64 4.05 95
0.200 2.18 5.43 2.70 3.93 96
u
z =
0.01 2.14 5.62 2.63 4.08 94
0.05 2.14 5.62 2.64 4.05 95
0.10 2.14 5.62 2.65 4.02 97
* In the case of model without intangible capital, z = uz = 0.
Note: 0 =  in the model without intangible capital
TFPR0 = TFP ratio in the model without intangible capital
F =  in the full model
TFPRF = TFP ratio in the full model
yR = TFPR
F
0
22